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Abstract	::	What	is	dignity?	My	starting	point	is	that	dignity	is	one	of	those	philosophical	primitives	that	admit	of	no	informative	analysis.	Nonetheless,	I	suggest,	dignity	might	yield	to	indirect	illumination	when	we	consider	the	kind	of	experience	we	have	(or	rather	find	it	fitting	to	have)	in	its	presence.	This	experience,	I	claim,	is	what	is	sometimes	known	as	recognition-respect.	Through	an	examination	of	a	neglected	aspect	of	the	phenomenology	of	recognition-respect,	I	argue	that	the	possession	of	inner	consciousness	is	a	precondition	for	the	possession	of	dignity.	The	reason	for	this,	I	suggest,	is	that	the	ultimate	privacy	of	the	contents	of	our	consciousness	grounds	a	kind	of	inviolability	characteristic	of	dignity.			The	concept	of	dignity	is	central	to	most	Western	ethical	systems.	Its	centrality	within	the	framework	of	Kantian	ethics	is	well	known:	dignity	is	a	kind	of	intrinsic	worth	that	inheres	in	persons	qua	rational	beings	capable	of	setting	their	own	ends	in	accordance	with	a	universalizable	rule	or	maxim.	It	is	an	intrinsic	worth	that	confers	on	persons	a	value	that	is	absolute,	non-tradable,	non-fungible.	Kant	famously	writes:	
In	the	kingdom	of	ends	everything	has	either	a	price	(Preis)	or	a	dignity	(Würde).	Whatever	has	a	price	can	be	replaced	by	something	else	which	is	equivalent;	whatever,	on	the	other	hand,	is	above	all	price,	and	therefore	admits	of	no	equivalent,	has	a	dignity.	(Kant	1785:	52;	4:434)	
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When	something	has	dignity,	it	has	a	kind	of	value	that	no	other	value	can	compete	with,	a	value	the	least	amount	of	which	categorically	trumps	any	quantity	of	any	other	type	of	value.1		Interestingly,	dignity	makes	a	crucial	appearance	in	Mill’s	utilitarian	framework	as	well.	In	classical	utilitarianism,	the	only	thing	that	has	intrinsic	value	is	pleasure;	all	other	goods	are	merely	instrumentally	good.	But	while	Bentham	took	all	pleasures	to	be	of	equal	intrinsic	value,	Mill	considered	that	some	pleasures	are	more	intrinsically	valuable	than	others.	In	particular,	spiritual,	intellectual,	or	contemplative	pleasures	are	more	intrinsically	valuable	than	sensory	or	sensuous	pleasures.	What	makes	the	former	intrinsically	superior	to	the	latter?	Mill’s	argument	features	a	surprise	appearance	of	the	notion	of	dignity:	
Now	it	is	an	unquestionable	fact	that	those	who	are	equally	acquainted	with,	and	equally	capable	of	appreciating	and	enjoying,	both,	do	give	a	most	marked	preference	to	the	manner	of	existence	which	employs	their	higher	faculties.	Few	human	creatures	would	consent	to	be	changed	into	any	of	the	lower	animals,	for	a	promise	of	the	fullest	allowance	of	a	beast’s	pleasures	…	We	may	give	what	explanation	we	please	of	this	unwillingness;	we	may	attribute	it	to	pride,	…	we	may	refer	it	to	the	love	of	liberty	and	personal	independence,	…	to	the	love	of	power,	or	to	the	love	of	excitement,	…	but	its	most	appropriate	appellation	is	a	sense	of	dignity…	(Mill	1863:	12-3)	Mill’s	basic	argument,	then,	is	that	everybody	familiar	with	both	types	of	pleasure	appears	to	prefer	the	spiritual	kind.	Setting	aside	the	cogency	of	this	argument,	it	is	striking	that	Mill	accords	dignity	a	special	role	in	it.	Mill’s	key	normative	premise	may	be	formulated	as	follows:	for	any	given	intrinsic	goods	G1	and	G2,	G1	is	intrinsically	better	than	G2	just	if	a	person	possessed	with	dignity	would	prefer	G1	over	G2.	(The	argument’s	only	other	premise	is	empirical:	that	subjects	of	greater	dignity	in	fact	prefer	contemplative	over	sensory	pleasures).	Thus	in	Mill’s	utilitarian	ethics,	too,	the	notion	of	dignity	is	tied	up	with	what	has	the	highest	possible	value.			 Outside	traditional	debates	in	normative	ethics,	the	notion	of	dignity	(often:	‘human	dignity’)	has	been	brought	to	bear	in	a	variety	of	political	and	social	debates.	
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It	is	often	invoked	to	underpin	the	notion	of	human	rights,	and	sometimes	(more	rarely)	that	of	animal	rights.2	(The	very	opening	sentence	of	the	United	Nations’	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	reads:	‘Whereas	recognition	of	the	inherent	dignity	and	of	the	equal	and	inalienable	rights	of	all	members	of	the	human	family	is	the	foundation	of	freedom,	justice	and	peace	in	the	world,	.	.	.’)	Given	this	evident	ethical	centrality	of	the	notion	of	dignity,	a	philosophical	analysis	and/or	account	of	that	notion	would	be	very	welcome.	The	problem,	however,	is	that	dignity	may	well	be	one	of	those	philosophical	primitives	which	admit	of	no	informative	analysis	in	terms	of	more	fundamental	notions.	Dignity	is	a	kind	of	intrinsic	value	that	inheres	in	some	things	and	not	in	others,	and	that	is	all	we	can	say	about	it.	We	cannot	‘get	underneath’	dignity	to	reveal	its	inner	structure,	its	components	and	grounds	–	because	it	has	none.	It	is	literally	a	fundamental	notion.		I	would	like	to	suggest	that	even	if	this	kind	of	primitivism	about	dignity	is	right,	there	is	still	philosophical	illumination	to	be	had	of	dignity,	namely,	by	examining	the	kind	of	experience	we	have	of	dignity,	or	more	accurately,	the	kind	of	experience	of	dignity	it	is	fitting	for	us	to	have.3	According	to	so-called	fitting-attitude	theories	of	value,	certain	values	consist	in	the	fittingness	of	certain	experiential	reactions:	for	a	person	to	be	morally	admirable,	for	example,	is	just	for	it	to	be	fitting	to	morally	admire	her.4	One	could	adopt	a	fitting-attitude	theory	of	dignity,	whereby	there	is	a	special	experience	E,	such	that	for	a	thing	T	to	have	dignity	just	is	for	it	to	be	fitting	to	have	E	toward	T.	But	even	if	we	reject	such	a	fitting-attitude	account	of	dignity,	we	can	still	think	of	the	relevant	E	as	an	
instructive	symptom	of	dignity.	Thus,	the	most	natural	way	to	reject	the	fitting-attitude	account	of	dignity	is	to	insist	on	an	inverse	direction	of	explanation:	whatever	E	is,	it	is	fitting	to	experience	E	in	the	face	of	T	precisely	because	T	has	dignity.	Such	a	dignity-first	view	is	incompatible	with,	indeed	contrary	to,	the	fitting-attitude	account	just	sketched.	But	what	both	views	share	is	commitment	to	a	certain	biconditional:	T	has	dignity	if	and	only	if	E	is	an	appropriate	experience	in	T’s	presence.	They	only	disagree	on	the	order	of	explanation:	whether	E’s	fittingness	is	grounded	in	T’s	dignity	(dignity-first	approach)	or	T’s	dignity	is	grounded	in	E’s	
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fittingness	(fitting-attitude	approach).	If	the	fitting-attitude	approach	is	right,	then	the	biconditional	actually	constitutes	an	account	of	the	deep	nature	of	dignity.	But	even	if,	as	I	suspect	is	the	case,	the	dignity-first	approach	is	the	correct	one,	the	biconditional	still	provides	a	singularly	profitable	perspective	on	dignity.	For	our	subjective	experience	is	something	we	have	direct	and	personal	acquaintance	with,	so	if	dignity	is	pegged	to	the	fittingness	of	a	specific	kind	of	experience,	we	can,	through	full	appreciation	of	the	relevant	experience	(and	the	sense	of	when	it	is	fitting),	obtain	a	theoretical	perspective	on	dignity	itself.		
ge	The	question	is	what	this	experience	E	is,	whose	fittingness	is	claimed	to	be	so	beneficially	pegged	to	dignity.	Before	this	question	can	be	answered,	though,	it	must	be	made	more	precise.	For	in	truth	there	is	probably	any	number	of	ways	to	relate	to	dignity	in	our	experience.	The	question,	more	precisely,	is	whether	there	is	a	
proprietary	way	of	relating	in	experience	to	dignity.	Let	me	explain	the	relevant	notion	of	proprietary	experience.		Consider	our	experiential	relation	to	danger.	We	can	think	to	ourselves	that	flying	is	dangerous,	we	can	wonder	whether	it	is	dangerous,	we	can	hope	it	is	not	dangerous,	and	so	on.	These	are	different	ways	of	engaging	with	danger	in	our	conscious	experience.	But	there	is	also	a	proprietary	way	of	engaging	with	danger	in	consciousness,	namely	fear.	Fear	is	the	kind	of	experience	whose	very	nature	is	to	relate	to	its	intentional	object	qua	dangerous.	It	presents	its	object	precisely	under	
the	guise	of	the	dangerous.	One	way	this	is	sometimes	put	is	that	danger	is	the	‘formal	object’	of	fear	(whereas	it	is	not	the	formal	object	of	thinking,	wondering,	or	hoping).	This	way	of	putting	things	may	be	misleading,	however.	For	the	crucial	feature	of	fear	of	flying,	distinguishing	it	from	(e.g.)	thoughts	and	wonders	about	the	dangers	of	flying,	is	that	danger	does	not	actually	appear	in	the	content	or	object	of	
fear.	Danger	is	not	that	which	is	feared;	only	flying	is	feared.	The	danger	is	rather	a	dimension	of	fear’s	very	way	of	relating	to	flying	–	its	proprietary	mode	of	presenting	flying.	The	way	I	like	to	put	this	is	as	follows:	whereas	the	thought	that	
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flying	is	dangerous	presents	flying	as	dangerous,	fear	of	flying	presents-as-dangerous	flying.	In	the	former,	danger	qualifies	the	thing	being	presented	(flying);	in	the	latter,	it	is	a	modification	of	the	attitude	taken	toward	that	object	(fear).		To	say	that	fear	is	our	proprietary	experience	of	danger,	then,	is	to	say	that	it	is	in	the	nature	of	fear	to	present-as-dangerous	whatever	it	presents.	Fear	of	snakes	presents-as-dangerous	snakes,	fear	of	policemen	presents-as-dangerous	policemen,	and	so	on.	By	the	same	token,	now,	to	look	for	our	proprietary	experience	of	dignity	is	to	look	for	a	kind	of	experience	whose	very	nature	is	to	present	its	objects	under	
the	guise	of	dignity.	What	we	are	after	here	is	not	just	any	old	experience	that	presents	dignitaries,	so	to	speak,	but	rather	the	kind	of	experience	whose	proprietary	intentional	mode	is	that	of	presenting-as-dignified	its	object.	Our	gambit	is	to	obtain	illumination	of	the	nature	of	dignity	through	a	phenomenological	analysis	of	an	experience	whose	very	nature	is	to	present-as-dignified	whatever	it	presents.5	It	is	a	substantive	claim,	of	course,	that	there	is	such	an	experience	–	that	our	psychological	repertoire	includes	a	kind	of	experience	which	by	its	nature	presents	its	objects	under	the	guise	of	dignity.	The	hunch	I	would	like	to	follow	here	is	that	there	is	indeed	such	an	experience	in	our	psychological	repertoire,	in	the	form	of	a	
specific	type	of	respect.	Both	parts	of	this	are	important.	The	first	part	is	that	respect	is	the	kind	of	mental	state	that	can	relate	us	to	dignity	in	a	proprietary	way.	The	second	part,	however,	is	that	not	all	types	of	respect	do.	Thus,	when	I	respect	a	colleague	for	her	original	and	subtle	yet	rigorously	executed	body	of	work	in	some	particularly	difficult	area,	say	the	philosophy	of	time,	I	do	not	experience	my	colleague	under	the	guise	of	dignity;	rather,	I	experience	her	under	the	guise	of	
merit,	or	distinction.	The	goal,	then,	is	to	isolate	the	specific	type	of	respect	the	having	of	which	toward	something	automatically	and	essentially	casts	that	thing	under	the	guise	of	dignity.		
ge	
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The	relevant	type	of	respect	seems	to	me	to	have	already	been	isolated	in	the	philosophical	literature,	in	the	form	of	what	Stephen	Darwall	has	called	recognition-
respect	–	and	has	distinguished	from	appraisal-respect.6	The	latter	is	the	kind	of	respect	we	pay	persons	in	virtue	of	their	accomplishments,	or	character	traits,	or	some	such	special	merit	they	exhibit.	Recognition-respect,	in	contrast,	is	insensitive	to	special	merit	and	is	directed	at	persons	purely	because	they	are	persons.	It	is	in	that	sense	a	non-discriminating	kind	of	respect,	and	its	value	resides	precisely	in	the	fact	that	it	does	not	draw	distinctions	between	persons;	it	does	not	separate	them	into	those	that	deserve	respect	and	those	that	do	not.	It	respects	equally	every	person	qua	person.		This	kind	of	non-discriminating	respect	is	the	kind	of	respect	that	might	be	pegged	to	dignity,	since,	plausibly,	dignity	is	something	that	inheres	in	all	persons	alike.7	We	might	conjecture,	then,	that	the	‘formal	object’	of	recognition-respect	is	precisely	dignity	(whereas	the	formal	object	of	appraisal-respect	is	something	like	merit	or	honor).	As	I	would	prefer	putting	it,	recognition-respect	is	that	attitude	whose	very	nature	is	to	present-as-dignified	its	object.	Showing	that	this	is	the	right	characterization	of	the	essence	of	recognition-respect	falls	outside	the	scope	of	this	chapter;	here	I	offer	it	as	something	like	a	‘philosophical	hypothesis.’	Interestingly,	what	is	essential	to	recognition-respect,	for	Darwall,	is	not	that	it	recommends	certain	ways	of	acting	toward	persons,	but	rather	that	it	recommends	certain	ways	of	refraining	from	acting	toward	persons:	
Some	fact	or	feature	is	an	appropriate	object	of	[recognition]	respect	if	inappropriate	consideration	or	weighing	of	that	fact	or	feature	would	result	in	behavior	that	is	morally	wrong.	To	respect	something	is	thus	to	regard	it	as	requiring	restrictions	on	the	moral	acceptability	of	actions	connected	with	it…	(Darwall	1977:	43)	A	few	lines	further,	Darwall	writes	that	recognition-respecting	x	is	a	matter	of	‘restricting	the	class	of	actions	that	would	be	morally	permissible’	toward	x.	In	this	respect,	Darwall’s	notion	of	recognition-respect	is	congruent	with	Kant’s	notion	of	respect	‘in	the	practical	sense’	(observantia).	Kant’s	notion	is	clearly	also	a	notion	of	
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respect	we	owe	others	in	virtue	of	the	dignity	of	humanity	inherent	in	them	(6:449).8	What	is	essential	to	this	kind	of	respect,	for	Kant,	is	the	treatment	of	the	other,	in	whom	the	dignity	inheres,	as	an	end	and	not	merely	as	a	means.9	What	this	means	is	far	from	obvious,	but	the	following	series	of	elucidations	may	take	us	part	of	the	way	to	getting	clear	on	this	–	and	will	yield	the	result	that	the	relevant	kind	of	respect,	like	Darwall’s	recognition-respect,	has	a	negative	action-guiding	force.	 		Let	us	start	by	noting	that,	in	the	nontechnical	sense	of	the	word,	a	person	P’s	end	is	a	certain	state	of	affairs	S	that	meets	at	least	two	conditions:	(i)	P	wishes	that	S	obtain;	(ii)	there	is	no	state	of	affairs	S*,	such	that	P	wishes	that	S	obtain	only	
because	P	wishes	that	S*	obtain.	That	is,	the	person’s	end	is	a	certain	state	of	affairs	the	person	wishes	for,	and	wishes	for	not	merely	instrumentally.	For	example,	if	I	want	my	son	to	be	happy,	and	not	only	because	this	is	more	likely	to	make	me	happy,	then	the	state	of	affairs	of	my	son	being	happy	is	an	end	of	mine.	Note	that	in	this	nontechnical	sense	it	makes	no	sense	to	speak	of	an	individual	object,	such	as	a	chair	or	a	person,	being	an	end;	only	states	of	affairs	can	be	ends.	To	describe	an	individual	as	an	end	in	this	sense	is	simply	a	category	mistake.	In	contrast,	it	is	not	a	category	mistake	to	describe	an	individual	object	as	a	
means,	though	states	of	affairs	can	also	be	means.	For	example,	I	may	want	my	son	to	receive	early	musical	education	because	I	believe	this	is	likely	to	enrich	his	life	and	enhance	his	likely	happiness.	In	that	scenario,	the	state	of	affairs	of	my	son	having	early	musical	education	is	a	means	to	one	of	my	ends.	But	the	tiny	drum	we	are	using	in	his	music	classes	can	also	be	described,	still	in	a	nontechnical	sense,	as	a	means	to	the	same	end	–	even	though	it	is	an	object	rather	than	a	state	of	affairs.	We	may	say,	to	a	very	first	approximation,	that	individual	x	is	treated	as	a	means	by	person	P	just	if	(i)	there	is	a	state	of	affairs	S,	such	that	S	is	an	end	of	P’s	and	(ii)	P	acts	on	x	with	a	view	to	bringing	about	S.10	With	this	nontechnical	notion	of	an	individual	object	being	treated	as	a	means,	we	may	devise	a	technical	notion	of	an	individual	being	treated	as	an	end,	namely,	the	notion	of	an	individual	that	is	treated	as	a	non-means.	If	I	am	fully	aware	
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that	I	could	act	on	the	tiny	drum	so	as	to	bring	about	my	end	(of	my	son	being	happy),	but	choose	not	to	do	so,	and	(crucially)	not	because	some	other	end	of	mine	would	be	thereby	furthered,	then	I	am	treating	the	drum	as	a	non-means,	and	to	that	extent	as	an	end	in	our	technical	sense.	This	would	of	course	be	strange	behavior	on	my	part,	but	the	same	structure	can	be	seen	in	more	natural	cases.	Suppose	I	know	that	I	could	manipulate	my	mother-in-law	into	financing	my	son’s	music	classes,	but	choose	not	to	do	so,	and	not	because	not	doing	so	somehow	furthers	some	other	end	of	mine	(to	remain	in	her	favor,	perhaps).	Then	I	am	treating	my	mother-in-law	as	a	non-means,	and	thus	as	an	end.	More	generally,	and	(again)	to	a	first	approximation,	
x	is	treated	by	person	P	as	an	end	(in	the	technical	sense)	just	if	there	is	a	state	of	affairs	S	and	an	action	A,	such	that	(i)	S	is	an	end	of	P’s	(or	for	that	matter	of	anybody’s	other	than	x),	(ii)	P	believes	that	performing	A	on	x	will	make	it	more	likely	that	S	obtain,	(iii)	P	deliberately	chooses	not	to	perform	A	on	x,	and	(iv)	there	is	no	other	state	of	affairs	S*,	such	that	P	deliberately	chooses	not	to	perform	A	on	x	
only	because	P	believes	that	not	performing	A	on	x	will	make	it	more	likely	that	S*	obtain.		Note	that	being	treated	as	a	non-means	in	this	sense	goes	beyond	simply	not	being	treated	as	a	means.	The	latter	can	occur	simply	out	of	laziness,	or	ignorance;	the	former	requires	a	deliberate	choice	on	the	agent’s	part.	At	the	same	time,	it	follows	from	the	above	elucidations	that	for	x	to	treat	y	as	a	non-means	is	fundamentally	for	x	to	refrain	from,	rather	than	engage	in,	certain	behaviors.	To	that	extent,	an	end	in	this	sense	is,	as	Kant	puts	it,	something	negatively	conceived	(4:437).	What	this	means	is	that	showing	‘practical	respect’	for	persons	is	negatively	action-guiding,	a	matter	of	avoiding	doing	certain	things.11	As	noted,	we	have	here	a	telling	convergence	with	Darwall’s	notion	of	recognition-respect.	Dignity	is	cast	in	both	cases	as	something	the	appreciation	or	awareness	of	which	does	not	inspire	us	
to	action,	but	on	the	contrary	makes	us	pull	back	and	tread	with	extra	care.		
ge	
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The	discussion	so	far	suggests	the	following	picture.	Dignity	in	itself	may	be	a	philosophical	primitive	not	amenable	to	informative	analysis.	Even	so,	however,	an	instructive	symptom	of	dignity	would	be	found	in	the	kind	of	experiential	reaction	it	is	fitting	to	have	to	its	presence.	This	experiential	reaction	is	a	specific	type	of	respect,	namely,	a	broadly	Kantian	recognition-respect	that	moves	the	subject	to	deliberately	refrain	from	acting	on	persons	even	though	she	believes	doing	so	will	enhance	her	own	ends	(or	for	that	matter,	anyone’s	ends	other	than	those	of	the	thing	being	respected).		 One	issue	this	picture	leaves	entirely	open	is	what	makes	something	a	fitting	object	of	such	Kantian	recognition-respect.	That	is,	what	are	the	grounds	of	dignity,	at	least	as	they	are	reflected	in	our	(appropriate)	experience	of	something	as	dignified?	As	is	well	known,	Kant	himself	provides	an	answer	in	terms	of	‘rational	nature,’	which	comes	down	–	crushing	many	subtleties	–	to	the	capacity	to	set	ends	for	oneself	and	indeed	to	set	moral	laws	that	yield	ends	which	are	independent	of	one’s	unreflective	inclinations	(4:431).	The	literature	on	this	is	enormous,	and	I	will	not	go	into	it	here.12	I	only	want	to	raise	a	difficulty	for	this	general	approach,	a	difficulty	of	the	form:	‘Can	you	account	for	certain	aspects	of	our	distribution	of	intuitions	about	the	kinds	of	thing	to	which	recognition-respect	is	owed?’		A	first	case	is	that	of	conscious,	feeling	creatures	who	are	incapable	of	any	action,	such	as	Galen	Strawson’s	‘weather-watchers.’13	These	are	pole-like	creatures	who	are	completely	immobile,	rigidly	stuck	to	the	ground,	but	who	nonetheless	can	sense	the	ambient	temperature,	care	about	it,	and	take	great	interest	in	it.	They	prefer	warm	weather,	hope	for	it	every	morning,	and	are	cheerful	when	they	feel	it	and	disappointed	when	they	do	not.	They	thus	have	a	rudimentary	perceptual,	cognitive,	and	emotional	life,	but	crucially,	they	have	no	capacity	for	action	and	we	may	stipulate	that	their	faculty	of	will	has	atrophied	as	a	result	–	they	experience	no	such	states	as	deciding,	intending,	or	choosing.	Intuitively,	the	weather-watchers	deserve	Kantian	recognition-respect.	Recognition-respecting	the	weather-watchers	feels	fitting:	even	if	moving	them	
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around	and	using	them	as	poles	for	our	beach-volleyball	activities	would	greatly	enhance	our	ends,	it	feels	fitting	to	refrain	from	doing	so.14	Indeed,	it	is	built	into	the	experience	of	recognition-respect	toward	the	weather-watchers	that	we	feel	a	pull	to	refrain	from	moving	them	around	(whether	or	not	the	pull	is	strong	enough	to	override	the	worse	angels	of	our	pre-rational	nature).	Given	Kant’s	approach	to	the	grounds	of	dignity,	however,	it	is	unclear	why	the	weather-watchers	should	be	owed	recognition-respect:	they	are	not	‘end-setting,’	let	alone	‘law-giving,’	creatures.	Kant	
could	of	course	maintain	that	the	intuition	that	the	weather-watchers	are	owed	recognition-respect	is	simply	misleading,	an	intuition	we	ought	not	to	endorse.	But	this	seems	just	plain	wrong:	we	very	much	should	avoid	using	the	weather-watchers	as	mere	means	to	our	own	ends.15	Conversely,	imagine	our	world	contained	certain	end-setting	automata	or	zombies.	It	is	beyond	doubt	that	much	of	our	behavior	is	unconsciously	driven,	which	seems	to	entail	that	we	have	many	purposes	and	goals	–	including,	presumably,	ultimate	goals,	that	is,	ends	–	that	are	unconscious.	Imagine	now	a	creature	all	of	whose	ends	are	unconscious;	indeed,	all	of	its	mental	life,	such	as	it	is,	is	unconscious.	It	experiences	no	feelings	or	emotions,	no	thought	processes,	no	bodily	or	perceptual	sensations.	Yet	its	unconscious	life	is	sufficiently	robust	a	duplicate	of	ours	that	it	engages	in	sensible,	goal-directed	behavior.	My	intuition	is	that,	once	I	am	careful	to	block	the	temptation	to	read	an	inner	life	into	a	system	that	engages	in	such	behavior,	I	find	that	no	reason	is	sustained	to	avoid	treating	it	as	a	mere	means	to	some	justified	ends.	Indeed,	it	would	be	a	negligent	opportunity	waste	not	to	harness	these	automata	to	the	betterment	of	everybody(	else)’s	lives.	If	we	could	use	them	to	alleviate	poverty	in	Africa	and	chose	not	to	do	so,	that	would	be	a	cardinal	moral	mistake.	Again,	however,	nothing	in	the	Kantian	framework	allows	us	to	take	this	stand,	since	nothing	prevents	our	thought-experimental	automata	from	lawful	end-setting.16		What	is	striking	in	these	two	cases	is	the	concomitant	variation	between	our	intuition-distribution	regarding	the	fitting	objects	of	recognition-respect	and	the	presence	or	absence	of	conscious	awareness	in	those	objects.	The	weather-watchers	
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command	recognition-respect,	we	intuit,	and	ex	hypothesi	they	exhibit	conscious	awareness;	the	end-setting	automata	do	not	deserve	recognition-respect,	and	they	have	no	conscious	awareness.	This	covariation	is	striking	given	the	absence	of	any	transparent	link	between	consciousness	and	dignity.	Why	would	consciousness	be	the	grounds	of	dignity,	or	at	least	a	necessary	component	of	those	grounds?	In	the	remainder,	I	develop	a	line	of	thought	that	may	point	in	the	direction	of	an	answer.17	
ge	Imagine	you	wake	up	in	an	impersonal	conference	hotel	room.	The	first	thing	you	are	aware	of	may	be	a	mixture	of	the	bed	against	your	body,	the	pillow	you	feel	and	see,	and	some	fleeting	images	from	a	fast-vanishing	dream.	You	go	to	the	bathroom,	grab	your	toothbrush	and	brush	your	teeth,	perhaps	take	a	shower.	You	put	on	your	nice	pants,	choose	between	two	potential	shirts.	You	turn	on	your	computer,	go	quickly	over	your	talk	for	that	day,	perhaps	reply	to	a	couple	of	emails.	Then	you	leave	your	room,	get	to	the	elevator,	go	to	the	lobby	in	search	of	breakfast.	You	walk	past	the	front	desk,	exchange	nods	with	a	member	of	staff.	You	find	your	way	to	the	restaurant,	choose	a	table	on	a	quiet	corner,	and	when	the	waiter	comes	over,	you	say	hello	and	order	a	coffee	and	two	eggs,	sunny	side	up.			 During	this	stretch	of	experience,	you	encounter	in	your	stream	of	consciousness	a	wealth	of	intentional	objects:	pillow,	toothbrush,	pants,	computer,	elevator,	front	desk	guy,	table,	waiter,	coffee	mug,	and	many	others	I	have	not	bothered	mentioning	(bathroom	mirror,	hallway	carpet,	elevator	mirror,	front-desk	bouquet,	fork	and	knife,	.	.	.).	These	objects	are	experienced	by	you	as	intentional	objects	of	your	conscious	awareness;	not	in	the	sense	that	you	are	somehow	unaware	that	they	also	enjoy	a	mind-independent	existence,	but	in	the	sense	that	in	undergoing	this	stretch	of	your	stream	of	conscious	awareness,	you	experience	yourself	as	the	sourcepoint	of	the	awareness	relation	and	experience	those	various	objects	as	so	many	termini	of	that	relation.	These	objects	populate	your	overall	picture	of	the	world,	your	living	sense	of	how	the	world	is.	We	may	say	that	they	are	denizens	of	your	worldmodel.	They	are	like	stars	and	planets	orbiting	you,	while	
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you	are	the	sun	from	which	emanate	the	rays	of	intentional	directedness,	of	conscious	awareness.	To	repeat,	this	is	not	to	claim	that	you	need	to	adopt	a	specially	reflective	attitude	to	consider	these	objects	as	mind-independent	entities.	Even	in	unreflective	mode,	you	are	well	aware	that	the	pillow	has	enjoyed	a	long	existence	before	you	checked	into	your	room	and	will	continue	to	do	so	after	you	go	your	merry	way.	Still,	when	you	do	encounter	the	pillow,	you	are	aware	–	if	ever	so	dimly	–	of	a	subject-object	structure	in	your	experience,	in	which	the	pillow	is	experienced	as	the	intentional	object	of	your	experience,	and	in	that	capacity	gets	absorbed	(annexed!)	into	your	internal	worldmodel.			 Among	the	objects	similarly	absorbed	into	your	worldmodel	on	the	same	morning,	however,	are	two	very	special	ones:	the	front-desk	guy	you	nodded	to	and	the	waiter	you	ordered	from.	This	waiter	you	greet,	order	from,	and	thank	for	your	coffee	is	in	one	way	a	denizen	of	your	worldmodel	just	like	the	pillow	you	woke	up	on.	But	if	you	take	the	time	and	make	the	effort	to	pay	the	right	kind	of	attention,	you	can	experience	a	certain	Gestalt	shift	that	introduces	a	new	way	of	being	aware	of	this	waiter,	whereby	he	is	also	experienced	as	something	more	than	just	another	terminus	of	your	awareness	relation;	he	is	also	the	sourcepoint	of	an	alternative	conscious	awareness	on	a	par	with	yours.	He	is	an	intentional	object	of	your	experience,	but	at	the	same	time,	he	is	also	a	subject	from	which	emanate	an	alternative	intentional	directedness.	When	you	see	the	waiter	under	this	guise,	he	is	experienced	as	nothing	less	than	a	walking	whole	worldmodel	alternative	to	yours.		Crucially,	the	waiter’s	alternative	conscious	awareness	can	never	become	yours;	the	intentional	objects	populating	the	waiter’s	worldmodel,	qua	intentional	objects	of	his	own	experiences,	resist	annexation	into	your	own	worldmodel.	The	reason	for	this	is	the	familiar	phenomenon	of	privileged	access.	(Note	well:	I	am	emphatically	not	assuming	here	that	we	have	privileged	access	to	all	our	mental	states;	only	that	we	do	to	some.)	Right	now	I	am	visualizing	a	two-headed	octopus;	I	know	that	this	is	so	in	a	way	nobody	else	does.	And	if	next	I	visualize	something	else,	equally	outlandish,	and	refuse	to	impart	the	contents	of	my	visualization,	then	the	following	becomes	true:	there	is	a	fact	–	part	of	the	natural	history	of	the	universe	–	
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which	is	known	to	only	one	person.	One	could	rightly	call	this	a	private	fact.	This	private	fact	is	an	aspect	of	my	worldmodel,	and	in	a	very	evident	sense	can	be	an	aspect	of	no	other	worldmodel	than	mine.	My	token	imaginative	experience	of	a	two-headed	octopus	cannot	be	taken	over	by	any	other	person,	and	correlatively,	the	two-headed	octopus,	qua	token	intentional	objects	of	that	token	experience,	is	a	denizen	of	my	worldmodel	only.	Now,	in	realizing	that	the	waiter	is	the	seat	of	an	entire	worldmodel	alternative	to	yours,	some	aspects	of	which	are	ineluctably	inaccessible	to	you,	you	experience	the	absolute	and	irreducible	otherness	of	the	waiter.	This	absolute	otherness	entrains	a	certain	kind	of	inviolability	that	we	will	explore	presently.		But	first,	note	that	although	the	dramatic	case	of	a	fact	known	entirely	to	only	one	person	brings	out	the	point	particularly	vividly,	the	(almost	trivial-sounding)	truth	is	that	a	person’s	experience	can	be	experienced	only	by	her.	When	you	and	I	look	at	the	moon,	it	does	not	matter	that	the	moon	appearing	to	us	is	exactly	the	same,	and	appears	to	us,	let	us	stipulate,	exactly	the	same.	The	fact	remains	that	there	is	a	token	moon-appearance	which	inhabits	your	worldmodel	and	a	
numerically	distinct	moon-appearance	inhabiting	mine.	The	token	moon-appearance	of	each	person	looking	at	the	moon	at	the	same	time	is	numerically	distinct.	We	can	appreciate	a	sense	in	which	this	is	true	even	without	an	analysis	of	appearance	talk.	The	subjective	experience	of	the	moon	is	unique	to	a	single	person,	and	this	is	so	regardless	of	whether	we	could	one	day	‘read	off’	the	contents	of	experience	from	entirely	‘objective,’	third-personal	evidence.	Even	if	you	are	a	neuroscientist	in	a	futuristic	scenario	where	the	neural	correlates	of	consciousness	have	been	fully	mapped	out,	and	are	inspecting	our	waiter’s	brain	as	he	eats	chocolate,	say,	you	will	not	thereby	experience	the	taste	of	chocolate	yourself.	The	chocolate	qua	intentional	object	of	the	waiter’s	experience	is	destined	to	remain	outside	the	borders	of	your	worldmodel.18		When	you	see	the	waiter	as	not	only	a	terminus	of	your	conscious	awareness,	but	also	the	sourcepoint	of	an	alternative	conscious	awareness,	this	modifies	your	overall	experience	of	the	waiter.	The	way	it	modifies	it	is	precisely	by	making	you	
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pull	back,	with	something	resembling	a	sense	of	awe,	and	producing	a	palpable	inclination	to	avoid	any	callous	behavior	toward	the	waiter,	any	behavior	that	takes	him	for	granted.19	In	seeing	the	waiter	as	a	whole	worldmodel	on	a	par	with	yours	(indeed	a	worldmodel	of	which	you	yourself	can	be	a	mere	denizen!),	you		experience	the	waiter	as	on	equal	footing	with	you.	He	is	not	just	another	planet	orbiting	you,	but	a	sun	in	his	own	right,	complete	with	an	army	of	stars	and	planets	orbiting	him.	As	such,	he	stops	being	just	an	actor	in	the	drama	of	your	own	life,	a	bundle	of	affordances	as	the	pillow	and	coffee	mug	ultimately	are.	There	is	a	realization	of	the	full	weight	of	the	presence	before	you	that	makes	you	tread	with	extra	care.		These	are	all	recognizable	characteristics	of	respect	as	characterized	by	Kant	and	Darwall.	It	is	not	just	the	kind	of	‘performative	respect’	you	show	the	waiter	when	you	speak	politely	to	him,	are	gracious	in	your	interaction	with	him,	and	are	generous	with	your	tip	to	him.	It	goes	much	deeper.	That	kind	of	performative	respect	is	consistent	with	all	manners	of	belittling,	scornful,	contemptuous,	ridiculing,	or	dismissive	thoughts	about	him.	But	the	experience	of	seeing	the	waiter	as	the	sourcepoint	of	a	complete	alternative	worldmodel	shuts	down	the	capacity	to	entertain	such	thoughts	about	him.	(By	‘thoughts’	here	I	mean	not	just	fleeting	ideas	that	occur	to	you	spontaneously,	but	judgments	that	you	endorse.	My	claim	is	that	any	capacity	to	have	belittling	judgments	about	the	waiter	is	somehow	neutralized	once	you	see	him	as	a	‘sun	like	you.’)	
ge	What	is	so	special	about	the	experience	of	a	person	as	the	sourcepoint	of	an	alternative	conscious	awareness	is	that	the	privileged	access	every	person	has	to	the	content	of	her	consciousness	gives	rise	to	a	kind	of	inviolability	(something	that	is	traditionally	taken	to	be	a	fundamental	aspect	of	dignity).20		 Consider	what	is	to	my	knowledge	the	only	exception	to	the	notion	that	every	experience	can	be	experienced	by	only	one	person:	the	craniopagus	twins	Krista	and	Tatiana	Hogan.	Reportedly,	when	Krista	is	tickled,	Tatiana	can	feel	the	resulting	
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bodily	sensation,	and	each	can	‘see	through	each	other’s	eyes.’	What	this	means,	at	bottom,	is	that	when	Krista	has	a	proprioceptive	tickle	experience,	or	a	visual	experience,	Tatiana	has	the	same	access	to	Krista’s	experience	that	Krista	herself	has.	That	is	to	say,	Tatiana	can	violate	the	‘phenomenal	privacy’	of	Krista.	But	this	is	an	exception	that	proves	the	rule,	the	rule	being	that	each	of	us	has	a	phenomenal	privacy	which,	as	a	matter	of	contingent	fact,	nobody	else	can	violate.	(That	the	fact	is	contingent	is	demonstrated	by	the	case	of	Krista	and	Tatiana	Hogan.)	Even	though	my	spouse	appears	to	have	greater	insight	into	the	unconscious	mechanisms	underlying	my	behavior	than	I	do,	not	even	she	can	access	my	occurrent	phenomenal	experiences	in	the	way	Tatiana	can	Krista’s.	As	noted,	the	case	of	Tatiana	and	Krista	is	the	only	known	exception	to	human	beings’	phenomenal	inviolability.		 This	kind	of	inviolability	is	in	the	first	instance	an	empirical	inviolability:	it	is	a	fact	that	the	internal	space	of	our	conscious	experience	cannot	be	violated	by	anybody.	But	this	original	empirical	inviolability	gives	rise	to	normative	inviolability	as	we	extend	our	claim	to	first-personal	authority	over	the	contents	of	our	minds	outside	the	sphere	of	phenomenal	experience.	Having	developed	a	sense	of	hermetic	inviolability	on	the	basis	of	our	privileged	access	to	our	live	stream	of	consciousness,	we	find	it	hard	to	swallow	when	this	special	standing	of	ours	is	challenged	with	respect	to	the	subterranean	mental	processes	underlying	it.	Our	claim	to	privileged	authority	outside	the	experiential	domain	may	be,	from	an	epistemological	standpoint,	baseless;	notheless	in	practice	people	clearly	make	such	a	claim.	One	learns	by	bitter	induction	not	to	make	such	comments	to	one’s	partner	as	‘You	are	not	really	annoyed	that	I	didn't	do	the	dishes,	you	are	upset	that	I	forgot	to	buy	diapers.’	If	this	author’s	experience	is	any	guide,	partners	do	not	take	well	to	this	sort	of	remark	–	and	for	good	reasons:	they	feel	violated.	Yet	the	mistake	in	making	such	a	remark	is	not	an	epistemic	mistake;	the	problem	is	not	in	the	first	place	one	of	insufficient	evidence.	It	is	rather	a	moral	mistake,	one	of	insensitivity	and,	indeed,	disrespect.	
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In	presuming	to	overrule	another	on	the	contents	of	his	or	her	mind,	even	where	those	contents	do	not	in	truth	enjoy	any	phenomenal	privacy,	one	offends	against	a	certain	moral	norm	–	what	I	would	like	to	call	the	norm	of	incorrigibility.	Unlike	the	principle	of	infallibility,	which	claims	that	we	cannot	go	wrong	about	what	goes	on	in	our	mind,	a	principle	of	incorrigibility	claims	only	that	we	cannot	be	
corrected	about	what	goes	on	in	our	mind	–	corrected,	that	is,	by	another	subject.	As	an	empirical	principle,	incorrigibility	is	not	much	more	plausible	than	infallibility.	But	as	a	moral	norm,	it	is	eminently	commendable.	The	norm	is	that	one	ought	not,	other	things	being	equal,	to	correct	others	regarding	their	mental	states;	and,	conversely,	one	has	the	right,	other	things	being	equal,	not	to	be	corrected	about	the	one’s	own	mental	states.	My	suggestion	–	admittedly	speculative	–	is	that	the	norm	of	incorrigibility	arises	originally	from	the	empirical	inviolability	associated	with	privileged	access	and	phenomenal	privacy.	(Note	that	the	falsity	of	the	principles	of	infallibility	and	incorrigibility	is	compatible	with	the	claim	of	empirical	inviolability.	The	latter	is	a	merely	existentially	quantified	claim	about	what	access	others	have	to	a	narrow	subset	of	one’s	mental	states.	Even	if	it	is	true	that	nobody	can	have	direct	access	to	my	current	imaginative	experience,	it	follows	neither	that	my	own	access	cannot	possibly	mislead	me	nor	that	I	have	such	access	to	all	my	mental	states.)		There	is	a	very	palpable	sense	in	which	the	norm	of	incorrigibility	is	a	norm	of	respect	–	that	abiding	by	it	grants	the	dignity	of	inviolability	to	others.	Herein	we	can	appreciate	the	link	between	dignity	and	consciousness.	We	can	vindicate	our	commonsense	intuition-distribution	in	cases	of	conscious	weather-watchers	and	end-setting	automata.	Our	intuitions	seem	to	suggest	that	the	possession	of	inner	consciousness	tracks	the	fittingness	of	recognition-respect,	which,	as	noted,	is	an	instructive	symptom	of	the	possession	of	dignity.	This	initially	surprising	link	between	consciousness	and	dignity	becomes	less	so	when	we	recognize,	on	the	one	hand,	that	inviolability	is	a	central	facet	of	dignity,	and	at	the	same	time,	that	inner	consciousness	introduces	both	a	real	empirical	inviolability	and	(through	it)	a	normative	inviolability	(in	the	form	of	the	norm	of	incorrigibility).21	
ge	
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The	main	contribution	I	have	ventured	to	make	in	this	essay	is	to	shine	a	light	on	what	I	take	to	be	a	neglected	aspect	of	the	phenomenology	of	recognition-respect,	namely,	that	it	is	directed	(when	fittingly	directed)	at	objects	that	have	a	conscious	life.	If	we	accept	that	fitting	recognition-respect	is	what	I	have	called	an	‘instructive	symptom’	of	dignity,	this	suggests	that	consciousness	is	a	prerequisite	for	dignity.	I	have	not	shown	here	that	consciousness	is	a	sufficient	ground	for	dignity,	but	I	confess	that	this	is	a	result	I	am	hoping	for,	with	all	its	likely	consequences	for	animal	rights,	medical	ethics,	and	other	issues	both	philosophical	and	not.22			
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§ Wood,	A.	1999.	Kant’s	Ethical	Thought.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.																																																											1	I	am	assuming	here,	as	is	common,	that	Kant’s	notion	of	dignity	is	our	notion,	that	is,	the	notion	of	some	intrinsic	worth	inhering	in	persons.	Sensen	(2009)	argues	that	this	is	not	at	all	Kant’s	notion.	I	do	not	have	the	competence	to	evaluate	Sensen’s	case	for	that	claim,	but	if	Kant’s	notion	of	dignity	is	not	the	one	we	are	interested	in	here,	then	my	interest	is	in	a	notion	of	dignity	commonly	attributed	to	Kant’s.			2	For	the	role	of	dignity	in	undergirding	animal	rights,	see	for	example	Meyer	2001.		3	The	approach	is	not	without	precedents:	see	Pritchard	1972,	Kolnai	1976.	The	former	appeals	to	the	‘sense	of	dignity’	in	seeking	illumination	of	dignity	itself	(Pritchard	1972:	300),	the	latter	speaks	of	‘the	proper	and	characteristic	response	we	yield	to	dignity’	(Kolnai	1976:	252).		4	In	its	most	general	form,	the	fitting-attitude	theory	is	applied	to	all	value,	such	that	a	thing	is	taken	to	be	valuable,	in	the	most	generic	sense	of	the	term,	iff	it	is	fitting	to	have	a	pro	attitude	toward	it.	Franz	Brentano	is	generally	regarded	the	first	fitting-attitude	theorist	of	the	sort	(see	Brentano	1889).	Ewing	seems	to	have	been	the	first	to	articulate	the	view	clearly	in	Anglo-American	philosophy	(Ewing	1939).	For	a	survey	of	recent	work	in	this	area,	see	D’Arms	and	Jacobson	2011.		5	One	might	worry	about	a	potential	circularity	in	the	approach:	we	illuminate	dignity	in	terms	of	a	specific	experience,	but	then	characterize	this	experience	in	terms	of	presenting-as-dignified.	However,	this	would	be	so	only	if	the	only	characterization	of	the	relevant	experience	is	in	terms	of	presenting-as-dignified.	In	fact,	however,	the	main	goal	of	this	chapter	is	to	give	a	more	informative	characterization	of	the	relevant	experience.	The	purpose	of	the	(highly	technical)	expression	‘presenting-as-dignified’	is	not	to	provide	an	explanation	of	what	the	relevant	type	of	respect	is,	but	just	to	draw	a	distinction	between	incidental	awareness	of	dignity	and	proprietary	awareness	of	dignity.			6	The	distinction	is	first	expounded	–	in	those	terms,	at	least	–	in	Darwall	1977.			
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																																																																																																																																																																					7	This	is	so	regardless	of	the	order	of	phenomenological	priority	between	appraisal-	and	recognition-respect.	A	natural	picture	treats	recognition-respect	as	the	more	fundamental	moral	emotion,	with	appraisal-respect	superimposing	on	it	in	special	cases.	According	to	Drummond	(2006),	however,	the	order	of	priority	is	opposite:	we	morally	appraisal-respect	a	person	when	she	leads	the	morally	good	life,	and	this	is	the	fundamental	experience	of	respect	as	a	moral	emotion;	we	recognition-respect	persons	as	such	only	because,	although	they	may	not	lead	the	morally	good	life,	it	is	constitutive	of	their	status	as	persons	that	they	have	the	capacities	required	to	do	so	(compare	Kolnai	1976:	259-60).	The	basic	idea	is	that	our	original	experiential	encounter	here	is	with	the	manifestation	of	the	relevant	capacities	rather	than	the	capacities	themselves.	My	present	point	is	that	even	if	the	experience	recognition-respect	is	somehow	phenomenologically	dependent	upon	a	more	basic	type	of	respect	experience,	nonetheless	it	is	the	former	that	is	pegged	to	dignity.		8	In	this	early	piece,	Darwall	himself	links	recognition-respect	to	what	Kant	had	in	mind	in	discussing	respect:	‘it	is	to	recognition	respect	of	persons	that	Kant	refers	when	he	writes,	“Such	a	being	is	therefore	an	object	of	respect	and,	so	far,	restricts	all	(arbitrary)	choice”.’	(Darwall	1977:	45)	Later,	however,	Darwall	develops	a	more	nuanced	picture	of	the	relationship	between	his	notion	of	recognition-respect	and	the	Kantian	notion	of	respect	for	persons	that	makes	room	for	Kant’s	routine	emphasis	on	appraisal-respect	of	certain	persons’	moral	excellence	(see	Darwall	2008).		9	Or	more	accurately,	‘always	at	the	same	time	as	an	end,	never	merely	as	a	means’	(Kant	1785:	39;	4:429).	Note	that	this	formulation	makes	two	separate	requirements.	However,	I	will	follow	Thomas	Hill	in	taking	the	as-an-end	requirement	to	be	prior	to	the	not-merely-as-a-means	requirement	(see	Hill	1980:	87).			10	I	say	‘to	a	first	approximation’	because	this	elucidation	is	likely	to	require	a	number	of	qualifications	and/or	modifications.	For	example,	perhaps	it	is	possible	to	treat	something	as	a	means	not	only	by	acting	on	it,	but	also	by	allowing	others	to	act	on	it	(this	could	take	the	form	of	an	omissive	rather	than	comissive	treatment-as-means).			11	I	set	aside	questions	about	whether	Kant	had	in	mind	respect	for	persons	themselves,	as	opposed	to	respect	for	a	certain	property	of	persons	(humanity)	or,	even	more	abstractly,	for	the	moral	law	(see	Murdoch	1997).	I	am	inclined	to	follow	Thomas	Hill	(1980:	91)	in	simply	distinguishing	as	many	notions	of	respect	(classified	primarily	by	the	kinds	of	objects	they	are	directed	at)	as	one	can	separate	in	Kant	and	then	homing	in	the	one	of	maximal	interest	–	in	this	case,	the	one	directed	at	persons.			12	For	relatively	recent	discussions,	see	Wood	1999	Chap.	2	and	Bagnoli	2003.		13	See	Strawson	1994	Chap.	9.		14	It	is	only	a	distracting	feature	of	the	thought-experiment	that,	for	all	that	has	been	said	so	far,	it	is	unclear	how	we	would	know	that	the	weather-watchers	are	sentient	beings.	We	can	easily	stipulate	that	in	the	weather-watcher	world,	we	simply	have	innate	knowledge	of	the	matter,	or	there	is	a	benevolent	god	who	informs	us	of	this.		15	I	realize	that	in	saying	this	I	am	simply	reiterating	the	intuition	the	Kantian	wants	us	not	to	endorse.	But	I	find	the	intuition	so	strong	and	so	healthy	that	I	am	happy	to	lean	on	it	heavily	as	a	data-point,	failure	to	accommodate	which	would	be	a	major	strike	against	any	account	of	recognition-respect.			16	One	might	simply	deny	that	the	automata	could	be	lawfully	end-setting	things	in	the	relevant	sense.	But	it	would	not	be	easy	to	do	so	without	trivializing	the	thesis	or	begging	any	questions.		
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																																																																																																																																																																					17	The	line	of	thought	in	question	echoes	themes	from	work	by	Max	Scheler	(1913),	Edith	Stein	(1917),	Sartre	(1943	Part	3),	and	especially	Levinas	(1961).	I	will	develop	the	line	in	my	own	terms,	though	–	without	the	thoroughness	of	these	philosophers’	treatments	and	with	a	view	to	getting	as	quickly	as	possible	to	the	key	relevance	to	the	issue	of	dignity.			18	It	is	a	separate	question	what	accounts	for	this	privileged	accessibility	of	conscious	experiences.	On	my	view,	every	token	experience	has	an	inbuilt	awareness	of	its	occurrence	(Kriegel	2009).	This	inbuilt	awareness	provides	a	unique	kind	of	direct	access	to	that	token	experience	irreproducible	by	any	person	not	actually	having	the	experience.			19	In	speaking	of	the	awe	attendant	on	this	experience	of	the	other	as	subject	in	his	or	her	own	right,	I	am	alluding	to	a	certain	phenomenal	similarity	between	the	experience	of	recognition-respect	and	the	experience	of	the	sublime	(see	Kolnai	1976:	253).			20	There	are,	in	my	view,	two	major	aspects	of	dignity	that	link	it	to	consciousness:	inviolability	and	irreplaceability.	Here	I	focus	on	inviolability.	For	a	discussion	of	the	irreplaceability	of	persons	and	how	consciousness	is	a	prerequisite	for	it,	see	Siewert	2013:	214-7.			21	Some	readers	might	object	to	my	claim	that	there	exists	the	relevant	kind	of	empirical	inviolability.	But	for	my	part,	I	cannot	see	what	reasonable	treatment	they	could	give	to	the	case	of	visualizing	outlandish	objects	and	deciding	not	to	keep	the	details	to	oneself	(or	perhaps	being	unable	to	share	these	details).	Other	readers	might	object	to	my	claim	that	the	wider-ranging	normative	inviolability	is	ultimately	grounded	in	this	narrower	empirical	inviolability.	I	agree	that	the	claim	is	speculative,	but	pending	a	more	plausible	hypothesis	I	am	inclined	to	stand	by	it.		22	Work	on	this	chapter	was	supported	by	the	French	National	Research	Agency’s	grants	ANR-11-0001-02	PSL*	and	ANR-10-LABX-0087,	well	as	by	grant	675415	of	the	European	Union’s	Horizon	2020	Research	and	Innovation	program.	I	am	very	grateful	to	comments	from	John	Drummond	and	Sonja	Rinofner-Kreidl	on	a	previous	draft,	which	will	doubtless	also	affect	my	future	work	on	the	topic.	For	conversations	on	relevant	topics,	I	am	indebted	to	Lizzie	Kriegel,	Chris	Prodoehl,	Charles	Siewert,	Enrico	Terrone,	and	Mark	Timmons.	A	conversation	on	Siewert’s	Los	Feliz	porch	in	October	2007	was	particularly	influential	in	sending	me	in	the	direction	of	ideas	this	chapter	tries	to	sketch.		
